During the past decade, the Soviets allocated resources equivalent to approximately $400 billion to both strategic offensive and defensive programs in almost equal amounts roughly $20 billion per year for each program. Space programs during this same period approached $80 billion.
Since 1981, Soviet strategic nuclear offensive forces have been upgraded as deployment of a fourth generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)(the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19) was completed. In 1985, the Soviets introduced the road-mobile SS-25, and in 1987 they began deployment of the rail-mobile SS-24 ICBM. In the Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet the TYPHOON, carrying 20 SS-N-20 MIRVed (multiple,independently-targetable reentry vehicles) missiles, was introduced, followed closely by the new DELTA IV carrying the even more capable SS-N-23. Soviet long-range bomber capabilities were enhanced by the introduction of the BEAR H carrying the AS-15 nuclear-armed cruise missile. Deployment of the new long-range strategic bomber, the BLACKJACK, is imminent.
In the area of strategic defense, the Soviets are modernizing the ballistic missile defense system around Moscow by replacing 64 old, reloadable above-ground GALOSH launchers with a two-layer defense composed of silo-based, long-range, modified GALOSH interceptor missiles; silo-based GAZELLE high acceleration end atmospheric interceptor missiles; and associated engagement, guidance, and battle management radar systems, including the new PILL BOX phased-array radar near Moscow at Pushkino. This phase of the modernization program should be completed in the late 1980s.
In space developments, the Soviets have orbited their MIR space station, established new endurance records for men in space, flight-tested a subscale model of what appears will become their space plane, and deployed a new medium-lift launcher, the SL-16. In addition, the Soviets launched their heavy-lift SL-X-17, capable of carrying payloads in excess of 100,000 kilograms. The SL-X-17 will also be used to launch the Soviet version of the space shuttle, which the Soviets acknowledge has undergone flight testing under its own power.
These are but a few examples of the trends in Soviet strategic programs. In this chapter, these and other trends, as well as future prospects, are discussed.
STRATEGIC FORCES
Missions and Operations
The Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) constitute the Soviets' premier military service. Created in 1959 to control all long-range, land-based missiles with a range exceeding 1,000 kilometers, the SRF plays the dominant role in the Soviet strategic forces, controlling over 6,000 of the Soviets' 10,000 strategic warheads.
In a nuclear conflict, SRF missiles would attack:
- Enemy nuclear forces, including silos, missile sites, airfields, naval bases, weapons depots, and nuclear command-and-control facilities;
- Enemy power-projection assets, including military forces, ports, and transportation links; and
- Enemy civilian and military industrial facilities.
Soviet military planners anticipate having to launch their nuclear forces under a variety of circumstances. Thus, they have conducted training and built assets to support the following operations.
Preemption - To achieve the capability to execute this preferred option, the Soviets have emphasized the collection and processing of strategic intelligence concerning their potential enemies' intentions. If convinced that the time for nuclear preemption has come, the Supreme High Command would order a strategic strike. To ensure that the SRF will be ready, the Soviets conduct numerous test missile launches throughout the year, many of them from operational bases.
Launch on warning - The comprehensive Soviet planning for a nuclear war includes preparing their forces to perform their missions under the most adverse conditions. In the event the Soviets fail to execute their preemptive option, they will depend on their early warning networks to provide them with sufficient response time. This network comprises launch detection satellites and over-the-horizon radars that can ascertain the general direction of an attack and provide up to 30 minutes warning. Eleven HEN HOUSE radars located around the USSR, which will be augmented in the mid-199Os by nine new large phased-array radars, can confirm the attack and begin missile tracking. Once notified, the SRF would have to launch its missiles before enemy warheads hit. To ensure that it can do so, the SRF exercises the procedures involved in such a response.
Launch after attack - Should the SRF not launch some or most of its missiles before an enemy attack, the Soviets have made provisions to help them survive the attack and conduct strikes in response. Their silos and launch control facilities, as well as their command, control, and communications links to the Supreme High Command, are hardened and highly survivable.
Command and communications entities also have mobile back-up units. To enhance survivability further, the Soviets have included both rail- and road-mobile missiles in their newest generation of ICBMs. Provisions have been made to refurbish and reload SRF silos, thereby enabling the Soviets to fire additional strategic missiles. These techniques will also be used after both sides' initial strikes during the period of prolonged nuclear conflict envisioned in Soviet doctrine.
ICBM Force Developments
The period 1980 to 1988 witnessed the rapid modernization and sophistication of the Soviet ICBM arsenal. Soviet missiles have been upgraded or replaced with new models of greater accuracy and survivability. After 30 years of sustained growth and improvement, the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces are extremely capable of conducting global nuclear strikes. Yet improvements to this force continue unabated. By the mid-199Os, the Soviets will be fielding a completely new generation of increasingly accurate missiles, many of them mobile, posing a heightened threat to US strategic forces. The Soviets maintain numerous SS- 11 and SS- 13 third-generation ICBMs. While these missiles are not capable of destroying hardened targets, they are fully capable of destroying unhardened targets.
The centerpiece of the current Soviet SRF arsenal is the SS-18 heavy ICBM, designed to destroy hardened targets such as ICBM silos and command facilities. This missile, larger than the US PEACEKEEPER, has been modernized over the last seven years. The majority of the current force consists of SS-18 Mod 4s, which carry 10 MlRVed warheads. The SS-18 force alone could destroy 65 to 80 percent of all US ICBM silos using two warheads per target, and still have 1,000 warheads remaining. The total SS-18 force has about 3,000 warheads.
The Soviets have also modernized their other two fourth-generation ICBMs, the SS-17 and SS-19. The SS- 19 Mod 3 carries six MIRVed warheads and is roughly comparable in size to the US PEACEKEEPER. The SS-17 Mod 3, while less accurate than the SS-18, carries four warheads and can destroy any unhardened targets. Both the SS- 17 and SS- 19 are capable of flexible targeting: they can hit Eurasian as well as transoceanic targets with a total of about 2,700 warheads, thereby facilitating the Soviet Union's ability to adjust to the situation created by the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
The Soviets have invested enormous effort and resources in increasing the survivability of their strategic systems against nuclear attack. To make their fourth generation missiles survivable, for instance, the Soviets placed them in rebuilt, very hard silos. Of the Soviet inventory of 1,400 operational ballistic missile silos, 818 have been rebuilt since 1972. Fully one-half of these silos have been totally reconstructed and hardened since 1980.
The Soviets have begun operating fifth-generation ICBMs, missiles with great throwweight and accuracy. They use solid-fuel propellants (which provide longer life and require less maintenance), and are fully mobile, and hence highly survivable. The SS-24, currently in the initial stages of deployment, is comparable in size to the US PEACEKEEPER. It carries 10 warheads and is designed for both rail and silo deployment. The SS-25 is a road-mobile, single-warhead, three-stage system. It can fire from field deployment sites or through the sliding roof garage it occupies at its base. The missile's mobility makes it inherently survivable and capable of reload/refire operations. The SS-25 joined operational Soviet SRF regiments in 1985.
By the 1990s, assuming the continuation of the current modernization tempo, the Soviets will be in a position to field over 15,000 warheads. Additionally, these weapons would be placed on newer, more capable and survivable strategic delivery systems during the next decade. It is likely that by the mid-199Os, the Soviets will have completely phased out their third-generation missiles, while the fourth-generation will be undergoing replacement by systems currently in development and testing. The SS-18 Follow-On, a more accurate version than its predecessor, has been tested recently; preparations for deployment of this missile are already underway. In October 1987, the US protested the apparent Soviet intention to test the SS-18 Follow-On in such a manner as to have its reentry vehicles land in the Pacific extremely close to the major populated islands of Hawaii. Mobile, solid-fueled SS-24s and SS-25s will be fully operational and will themselves be replaced by follow-on systems in the next decade. These advances will ensure that the Soviet ICBM force will remain the world's largest and most modern strategic missile force.
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Force Developments
The Soviet Navy operates the world's largest strategic missile submarine force. Although it includes some older submarines, the majority of the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force consists of more modern DELTA I, II, and III submarines armed with intercontinental-range missiles that can reach North America from Soviet ports and coastal waters.
Within the last seven years, the Soviets have introduced the TYPHOON and the DELTA IV, both equipped with more accurate, longer range MIRVed intercontinental missiles. The introduction of these systems has enabled the Soviets to increase their SLBM weapons delivery capabilities by nearly 30 percent without increasing the overall size of their SSBN force. At the same time, submarine survivability was being significantly enhanced.
Based in the Pacific Ocean and Northern Fleet areas, the Soviet ballistic missile submarine force is equipped with over 3,000 warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). In wartime, a portion of these forces is expected to serve as a survivable nuclear reserve. In the last decade, the deployment of multiple warhead SLBMs with ranges sufficient to reach the United States from waters near the USSR has allowed the Soviets to plan to operate the majority of their SSBNs in protected "bastions," or havens, near the Soviet Union. Mixed groups of naval air, surface, and submarine assets, along with fixed sensors and minefields, will operate in wartime to protect these SSBN bastion areas against US/NATO antisubmarine forces.
Additionally, within the last several years the Soviet Navy has increased greatly its interest in the Arctic as an area of military operations, particularly for its SSBNs. The Soviets think that SSBN operations in the Arctic ice zone could increase submarine survivability, based on their belief that operations under and near the Arctic ice pack might provide their deployed SSBNs with greater security and protection than in more exposed waters.
To ensure that they can communicate with their SSBN/SLBM assets, the Soviets have recently improved their submarine command, control, and communications (C3) systems by deploying an extremely low frequency (ELF) communications system. Newly deployed BEAR J aircraft offer an additional means of effective SSBN communication redundancy by providing very low frequency (VLF) communication transmissions to SSBNs on patrol.
The Soviets may begin at-sea flight testing of a modified version of the SS-N-20 missile sometime this year. A modified version of the SS-N-23 missile will probably complete testing in 1988. Improved accuracy of the Soviets' latest SLBM systems, as well as possible efforts to increase SLBM reentry vehicle size and warhead yield, would confirm Moscow's plans to develop a hard-target-kill capability for its SLBM force. The new missile support ship class, the ALEXANDER BRYKIN, is designed to reload SSBNs with these modern missiles. This capability will allow Soviet SSBNs to hold additional targets at risk.
Soviet Strategic Aviation Developments
The Soviet intercontinental bomber force has historically lagged behind the SRF and navy in systems development. Recent Soviet efforts in strategic aviation, however, particularly with the BEAR H and BLACKJACK long-range bombers, signal heightened interest in a manned-bomber attack force to diversify the character of their strategic forces.
The BLACKJACK is the world's largest and heaviest bomber. Designed to carry bombs and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), the BLACKJACK can cruise subsonically over long ranges, perform high-altitude supersonic dash, and attack utilizing low-altitude, high subsonic penetration maneuvers. As with the B-l, the BLACKJACK has a blended wing-body design with a variable-sweep wing and a single vertical stabilizer. It has an unrefueled combat radius of about 7,300 kilometers and a maximum speed of Mach 2.0. Eleven BLACKJACK bombers have been produced, and the first BLACKJACK regiment should begin forming this year. The backbone of the modern Soviet intercontinental bomber force of the 1980s, however, will remain the BEAR H, armed with the AS-15/KENT ALCM. The Soviets also have in their inventory about 100 other BEAR bombers and air-to-surface missile carriers. The BEAR was first produced in the late 1950s, but some of these aircraft have been updated in subsequent years with new technology.
Soviet strategic aviation capabilities are enhanced through training and exercises. BEAR H bombers are regularly observed simulating attacks against North America. When operational, the BLACKJACK can be expected to engage in similar operations. Additionally, older BEAR bombers carrying the AS-3 air-to-surface missile (ASM) are being rejuvenated through a modification program that upgrades them to carry the newer AS-4 supersonic ASM. More than 45 of these reconfigured aircraft, designated BEAR Gs, are now operational.
The current Soviet intercontinental bomber force is more flexible and survivable than it has ever been. Prior to the recent introduction of longer range cruise missiles, Soviet bombers would have had to penetrate Canadian or US airspace to launch their attacks. Now the BEAR H can launch its long-range AS-15 cruise missiles from well offshore and still hit targets in North America. The BLACKJACK will be able to conduct both standoff and penetration attacks using a variety of nuclear missiles and bombs.
Until recently, the Soviets had only aging BISON tankers for aerial refueling support of BISON and BEAR aircraft. In 1987, the first unit of new MIDAS tankers entered operational service. While the BISON tankers remain in service, they are expected to be replaced as sufficient numbers of MIDAS tankers become available.
Cruise Missile Developments
The Soviets are on the verge of deploying a variety of sophisticated cruise missile systems. At sea, the Soviets have tested the SS-N-21 sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). A variety of Soviet general purpose attack submarines such as VICTORs, AKULAs, or SIERRAs could carry and launch the SS-N-21. Additionally, a YANKEE-Class nuclear submarine has been converted to carry SS-N-21 missiles. Targets in either Eurasian or North American theaters could be attacked by these accurate missiles, which are fitted with nuclear warheads. The larger SS-NX-24 missile, which could be carried from specialized submarine platforms such as a modified YANKEE, is expected to be operational in the next few years.
The Soviets have deployed an air-launched long range cruise missile the AS-15/KENT with their intercontinental-range BEAR H force. Armed with this standoff weapon, the BEARs pose a much greater threat to Eurasian and US targets. Work on a new bomber-launched cruise missile is underway.
The Soviets had developed and were preparing to deploy a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)the SSC-X-4 which is a version of the SS-N-21/AS-15 system. A GLCM-variant of the larger SS-NX-24 was also a possibility as a theater strike weapon. Both GLCM systems are banned by the INF Treaty.
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES
In addition to ICBMs, the SRF is responsible for intermediate-range (IRBM) and medium-range (MRBM)ballistic missiles the latter two being longer range intermediate-range nuclear forces. The INF Treaty will eliminate these Soviet systems. Until the treaty enters into force and the missiles are destroyed as required over a three-year period, INF systems, such as the SS-20, will continue to pose a threat to Eurasian targets.
The last seven years have seen the full expansion and deployment of the Soviet SS-20 IRBM force, from approximately 250 SS-20s in 1980 to a high of 441. The less capable SS-4 MRBM force has been reduced in size during this period, and now numbers approximately 50 missile launchers.
The SS-20 is a remarkably capable IRBM system which first became operational in 1977. The missile carries three highly accurate MIRVed warheads and can deliver them out to a range of about 5,000 kilometers. It has a reliable solid-fuel propellant system and is fully mobile, making countertargeting efforts extremely difficult. It can fire either from sliding-roof garages at regimental bases or from field-deployed sites. The Soviets have the capability to reload and refire SS-20s. The older SS-4 system is still maintained at the theater level. This liquid-fueled system is located at soft launching sites. The missile can deliver one warhead out to a range of 2,000 kilometers.
These missile forces can be augmented or replaced by a variety of other nuclear delivery systems. The Soviets retain 12 older GOLF II diesel-powered ballistic missile submarines, six of which are assigned to the Baltic Fleet. Each GOLF can deliver three SS-N-5 missiles on Eurasian targets. Additionally, Soviet aviation assets, particularly the BACKFIRE and FENCER, can conduct theater nuclear operations.
The role of Soviet INF missiles will likely be redistributed to other systems in light of the recent INF Treaty. The treaty requires the destruction without replacement of all existing missiles and launchers over a three-year period, including the SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 ballistic missiles, as well as the SSC-X-4 cruise missile, which was tested but not deployed. After the agreement takes effect, however, the Soviets maybe able to turn to other strategic ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs), aircraft, and perhaps sea-launched cruise missiles to fulfill their strategic theater requirements in Eurasia.
SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES
The Soviet military also deploys a wide variety of nuclear delivery systems with a range less than 1,000 kilometers. These include shorter range intermediate-range nuclear forces (SRINF) missiles, which are covered by the INF Treaty. Specifically, the SCALEBOARD and SS-23/SPIDER will be eliminated within 18 months after the treaty enters into force. The INF Treaty does not cover short-range nuclear missiles with a range less than 500 kilometers, dual-capable aircraft, and artillery pieces. Thus, while the INF Treaty eliminates the most threatening Soviet nuclear systems, the Soviets will retain a more than adequate capability to provide tactical nuclear support for their ground forces.
The SRINF systems eliminated by the INF Treaty had posed new challenges to NATO during the 1980s. At the theater- and front-level, the older SCALEBOARD had been replaced by a modernized version. The modification significantly improved the missile's accuracy while maintaining its 900-kilometer range. Until 1983, the SCALEBOARD had not been deployed outside the USSR. In 1984, one brigade was deployed in Czechoslovakia, and two brigades were deployed in East Germany. SCALEBOARD units are also located in the western Soviet Union, and in the Central Asian and the Far Eastern USSR. Over 100 SCALEBOARD missiles remain in the inventory.
At the front- and army-levels, the SS-23/SPIDER was designed as the successor to the 1960's vintage SCUD. Over 75 are now in the inventory. With improvements in accuracy, responsiveness, and range, the SS-23 poses a greater threat to time-critical targets such as NATO nuclear missile units, airfields, and air defense sites. The SPIDER has been deployed since 1985 in several locations within the USSR and was recently introduced into East Germany. Over 600 SCUD missiles, however, remain deployed. Although SCALEBOARDs, SPIDERs, and SCUDs could be deployed with chemical or conventional high-explosive warheads, their principal role is to serve as the ground force's primary nuclear fire support means.
The Soviet military also operates tactical nuclear missile and artillery systems deployed at front level. At the division-level, nuclear fire support is provided by 660 free-rocket-over-ground (FROG) missiles, deployed in battalions of four launchers (one in each division). In 1981, the SS-21, a guided missile (providing improvement in both range and accuracy), began replacing the FROG in forward-deployed divisions, and 140 are now deployed. Division-level SS-21 battalions are being consolidated into brigades in Soviet armies in East Germany.
Soviet nuclear-capable artillery and mortars underwent qualitative improvements in the 1980s, with the replacement of older, towed-artillery pieces with self propelled (SP) versions. These SP weapons, including the 152-mm howitzer 2S3, the 152-mm gun 2S5, the 203-mm gun 2S7, and the 240-mm 2S4 mortar, enable the Soviets to provide more responsive nuclear support for their ground maneuver units.
STRATEGIC DEFENSES
In a dramatic departure from past assertions that only the United States is working to "militarize" space, General Secretary Gorbachev acknowledged on 30 November 1987 that the USSR is involved in strategic defense research. He stated, "The Soviet Union is doing all that the United States is doing, and I guess we are engaged in research, basic research, which relates to these aspects which are covered by the SDI of the United States." But the Soviet effort into all aspects of strategic defense has been consistently far more vigorous than that of the United States.
Ballistic Missile Defense
The Soviets maintain the world's only operational ABM system, and a nearly completed construction program begun during the 1980s will yield an expanded and upgraded system comprising a two-layer defense of 100 launchers. When fully operational around 1989, the system will defend selected leadership and strategic facilities in the Moscow area.
The new Moscow ABM system includes two interceptor missiles: a long-range modified GALOSH ABM that is intended to engage ballistic missile reentry vehicles(RVs) outside the atmosphere; and the GAZELLE, a shorter range, high-acceleration missile that, like the now-defunct US SPRINT system, is designed to engage RVs after they have reentered the Earth's atmosphere. New, hardened silos have been constructed for the new interceptor missiles. The modified GALOSH and GAZELLE are expected to become operational in 1988 or 1989.
A large multifunction phased-array radar nearing completion at Pushkino is also an integral part of the new Moscow ABM system. The radar, which has 360-degree coverage, will provide support for the new interceptor systems. It is expected to reach full operational capability around 1989.
In the aggregate, the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM related actions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. These actions include radar construction, concurrent testing, SAM upgrade, ABM rapid reload, ABM mobility, and deployment of ABM components to Gomel.
The Soviets began building a large phased-array radar (LPAR) network in the 1970s, and since 1981 the number of LPARs under construction has more than doubled. There are now nine LPARs in varying stages of completion, forming a nearly complete ring of ballistic missile detection coverage for the Soviet landmass. They duplicate and augment coverage provided by the older HEN HOUSE ballistic missile early warning radars, but also could provide the detailed detection and tracking data which would be required for a nationwide ABM system. Since these radars take a long time to construct, the entire network probably would not be operational until the mid-199Os.
The Soviets have deployed and tested components required for an ABM system that could be deployed to a site in months rather than years. Recent Soviet activities with respect to moving a FLAT TWIN ABM radar and a PAWN SHOP van, both components of an ABM system, from a test range and initiating deployment at a location outside an ABM deployment area or ABM test range, constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty. Moreover, the SA-10/SAM system already in the air defense forces may have the potential to intercept some types of ballistic missiles, as may the SA-X-12B/GIANT when it is deployed.
One of the principal concerns regarding Soviet noncompliance with the ABM Treaty is the Krasnoyarsk radar, which is in clear violation of the treaty. The only permitted functions for an LPAR with Krasnoyarsk's location and orientation would be space-tracking and National Technical Means (NTM) of verification. Conclusive evidence suggests, however, that this radar is primarily designed for ballistic missile detection and tracking, not for space-tracking and NTM as the Soviets claim. Moreover, the coverage of the Krasnoyarsk radar closes a major gap in the coverage of the Soviet ballistic missile detection, warning, and tracking screen. The location of the Krasnoyarsk radar allows it to provide warning of a ballistic missile attack, to acquire attack characterization data that will enable the Soviet strategic forces to respond in a timely manner, and to aid in the battle management of Soviet strategic defensive forces. All LPARs, including the Krasnoyarsk radar, have the inherent capability to track large numbers of objects accurately. Thus, they not only could perform as ballistic missile detection, warning, and tracking radars, but also have an inherent technical potential, depending on location and orientation, of contributing to ABM battle management. A US Congressional delegation visited the Krasnoyarsk LPAR facility on 5 September 1987 and was allowed to view selected areas of both the transmitter and receiver facilities. No information derived from this visit, however, changed the assessment that the radar is designed for ballistic missile detection and tracking.
Advanced Strategic Defense Technologies
Since the 1960s, the Soviets have been conducting a substantial research program to develop a defense against ballistic missiles. As noted by General Secretary Gorbachev, this effort covers many of the same technologies currently being explored by the US SDI. The Soviet effort, however, involves a much greater investment of plant space, capital, and manpower.
For example, the Soviet laser research program, with ballistic missile defense applicability, has historically been much larger than its US counterpart. At Sary Shagan, one of a half-dozen major R&D facilities involved in laser research, the Soviets are believed to be developing several lasers for strategic applications such as air defense or a terminal ABM, and at least one laser believed capable of an antisatellite mission.
Moscow hopes that its huge investment to design and build high-energy lasers will provide it with laser systems for strategic air defense, space-based antisatellite missions and, conceivably, defense against ballistic missiles. The first prototype systems, some with limited operational capability, might be seen before the end of the decade, but except for air defense, full-scale, fully operational defensive systems are not expected until the late 1990s at the earliest.
In some areas of ballistic missile defense-related technology, the USSR has progressed beyond technology research. It has ground-based lasers with some capability to attack US satellites, and it could have a space-based antisatellite laser prototype within the next several years. The Soviets also could have ground-based laser prototypes for ballistic missile defense in the early 1990s, and they could begin testing a limited-scale deployment system in the late 1990s.
Moscow is exploring several other advanced technologies for use in ballistic missile defense. Since the late 1960s, for instance, the Soviets have explored the use of particle beam and kinetic energy weapons for antisatellite (ASAT) and ballistic missile defense missions. Although the Soviets may be able to test a prototype particle beam ASAT weapon in the mid-to-late 1990's, operational systems that could destroy satellites or incoming ballistic missiles will not exist until the 21st century.
Long-range, space-based kinetic energy weapons for defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be developed until at least the mid-199Os. The Soviets could, however, deploy a short-range, space-based system for space station defense or close-in attack by a maneuvering satellite in the near future.
The USSR has also conducted research in the use of radio-frequency weapons to interfere with or destroy the electronic components of ballistic missile warheads or satellites. A ground-based version of such a weapon could be tested in the 1990s. Free-electron lasers, which generate intense microwave and millimeter-wave pulses, have been developed by the Soviets, possibly for use in radio-frequency weapons.
Passive Defense
The Soviet passive defense program is a comprehensive system of measures designed to inhibit the effects of a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. The main objectives of the passive defense program in effect today are: ensuring the survival and continuity of the Soviet leadership; planning for efficient wartime mobilization of manpower and the economy; protecting the industrial base and essential workers; and providing a credible reconstitution capability. Integral to the Soviet passive defense program are thousands of hardened facilities.
Deep Underground Facilities
For 40 years, the Soviet Union has had a vast program underway to ensure the survival of the leadership in the event of nuclear war. This multifaceted program has involved the construction of deep underground bunkers, tunnels, secret subway lines, and other facilities beneath Moscow, other major Soviet cities, and the sites of major military commands. This program is designed solely to protect the senior Soviet leadership from the effects of nuclear war. These deep underground facilities today are, in some cases, hundreds of meters deep and can accommodate thousands of people. As nuclear arsenals on both sides have become larger and more potent, these facilities have been expanded and have reached greater depths.
Neither changes in the Soviets' leadership nor the restructuring of the strategic balance and the refinements in military doctrine that accompanied these changes appear to have diminished their commitment to the program. Over the program's history, its purpose has remained unchanged leadership survival so that it can maintain internal control and ensure that Soviet military power can be centrally directed throughout all phases of a world war. The secrecy of the program and the uncertainty about the extent and nature of these facilities are major causes for concern.
The deep underground program, which rivals Soviet offensive strategic weapons programs both in scale and level of commitment, remained undiminished even as the Soviets agreed to limit their defenses against ballistic missiles in the ABM Treaty. Indeed, a major augmentation of the original activities was started about the time the ABM Treaty was being concluded. Yet another round of construction on these complexes began in the early 1980s, when Soviet leaders were publicly emphasizing that a nuclear war would be so catastrophic that attempts to achieve victory or even seriously limit damage in such a war no longer made sense. The latest round of construction coincided with intensified Soviet preparations for the possibility that a nuclear war could be protracted.
The deep underground facilities beneath the city of Moscow are directly associated with the main centers of state power. They provide the leaders of the various organs of state control the opportunity to move from their peacetime offices through concealed entry ways down to protective quarters below the city, in some cases,hundreds of meters down. Once there, the Politburo, the Central Committee, the Ministry of Defense, the KGB, and the apparatuses of the many other state ministries can remain sheltered while the USSR converts to a wartime posture. The fruits of this 40-year construction program now offer the Soviet wartime leadership the option of remaining beneath Moscow or, at some point, boarding secret subway lines connecting these deep underground facilities. From there the Soviets can make their way to nearby underground complexes outside Moscow where they plan to survive nuclear strikes and to direct the war effort. The support infrastructure for these facilities is substantial. A highly redundant communications system, consisting of both on-site and remote elements, supports these complexes and permits the leadership to send orders and receive reports through the wartime management structure.
These installations also have highly effective life support systems capable of protecting their occupants against chemical and biological attack. Such arrangements may enable independent operations to be carried out from these facilities for many months. The top leadership of the USSR also has the option of going by secret subway lines out to Vnukovo Airfield, about 17 miles southwest of the Kremlin, and from there flying to remote facilities. They also have a fleet of aircraft, trains, and other vehicles that provide yet another option for survival; these platforms have extensive communications support, which would permit the surviving leadership to reconstitute Soviet military power for ensuing military operations. While Soviet preparations for leadership protection are most intensive around Moscow because of its critical role in wartime management, there are similar programs in other key cities. Moreover, Soviet planning calls for the leadership's evacuation from several hundred additional cities to rural relocation facilities.
The Soviets also use worked-out mines to increase the number of relocation facilities. These old mines have the added advantage of reducing the cost of the passive defense program since the excavation costs have already been recovered. The mines would also provide concealed storage sites for military stores and equipment, expanded storage capacity for the strategic stocks reserve network, and improved continuity of economic activity in wartime. By using these old mines,the Soviets can expand the already large number of underground facilities available for leadership protection quickly and inexpensively.
The Soviets' experience with civil defense, leadership protection, and massive relocation efforts during World War II has taught them the benefits of a leadership protection program. While continuing improvements indicate the program does not yet fully meet Soviet requirements, the Soviets have made extensive preparations to give the leadership the potential for effective performance in a nuclear war. The enormous and continuing Soviet investments in the leadership protection program indicate that they believe its benefits are well worth the large cost. Unceasing efforts in strategic offensive forces and active defensive forces modernization, when coupled with efforts to protect the leadership, clearly indicate that the USSR expects to exercise national command and control through all phases of protracted nuclear war.
SPACE FORCES
The continuing evolution of Soviet military space doctrine, the increasing number of military-related launches, and the high priority given to development of space-related strategic offensive and defensive systems reflect the Soviet determination to use space primarily for military purposes. The long-term Soviet commitment to space was reaffirmed by General Secretary Gorbachev in May 1987 when he declared, "We do not intend to relax our efforts and lose our vanguard position in the conquest of space."
Space Programs and Capabilities
The Soviets currently operate about 50 types of space systems for military and civilian uses, including manned space stations (MIR and the inactive SALYUT 7), and reconnaissance, launch-detection, navigational, meteorological, and communications satellites. Some types of satellites - the Soviet space station, the materials processing satellite, the radar ocean reconnaissance satellite (RORSAT), the electronic intelligence(ELINT) ocean reconnaissance satellite (EORSAT), and the radar-carrying oceanographic satellite are unique to the Soviets.
The USSR conducts approximately 100 space launches annually from its three "cosmodromes." One of these, Tyuratam, is the world's largest. To maintain their impressive launch rate, the Soviets have about 20 launch pads and use eight operational types of boosters to launch their payloads. A ninth booster, the SL-X-17, is in development and testing. Their high launch rate allows the Soviets to maintain an increasing number of active satellites in orbit up from about 120 in 1982 to about 150 in 1987. At least 90 percent of the Soviet satellites in orbit have military purpose and can support offensive or defensive operations.
Although the Soviets steadfastly maintain they have no military space program, about 150 of the approximately 200 operational Soviet satellites projected to be in orbit by the mid-199Os will most likely have purely military missions such as ocean reconnaissance and targeting, electronic intelligence, imagery reconnaissance, and communications. Another 40 will probably support joint military-civilian functions, including communications, navigation, and weather data. The approximately 10 remaining satellites are likely to conduct interplanetary probes and other scientific missions. The lifetimes and survivability of Soviet satellites are expected to increase during the next 10 years because of more sophisticated technology and the placement of satellites at higher altitudes.
Military Support From Space
The Soviets continue developing and deploying space systems designed to support military operations on Earth. They now have a fully operational network dedicated to warning them of an ICBM attack, and they operate several types of space-based reconnaissance systems. Two of these, the RORSAT and EORSAT, can be used to locate naval forces. Moreover, the Soviets practice their detection and targeting techniques, routinely launching these satellites to monitor both their own and NATO naval exercises.
Moscow continues to expand its sophisticated satellite reconnaissance program. Several planned improvements such as a data-relay satellite system could improve the timeliness of Soviet intelligence. Demonstrations of flexibility and versatility in launching and deploying surveillance systems have continued, and the Soviets are capable of redirecting them for worldwide missions as required. Meanwhile, their satellite imagery reconnaissance capability has been refined, and space-based electronic intelligence is being upgraded.
While the Soviets are expected to maintain their current launch-detection satellite network, they are probably working on a space-based surveillance system to detect the launch of US SLBMs, as well as European and Chinese missile launches. Although the USSR's land-based ballistic missile defense radar network permits detection of in flight SLBMs, a space-based geosynchronous launch-detection satellite system could increase warning time significantly. The Soviets will probably have the technical capability to deploy such a satellite system within the next several yearn
The Soviets continue deploying their space-based global navigation satellite system known as GLONASS. This system will probably provide highly accurate positioning data for military and civilian users by 1992. GLONASS is similar to the US NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS). In fact, the Soviets used digital signal-processing data from GPS documents to develop GLONASS. GLONASS is being placed in a GPS-like orbit. Based on the 9 to 12 satellites announced for the system, GLONASS would have a worldwide, two-dimensional navigation capability. If the Soviets want GLONASS to provide worldwide, three-dimensional navigation upgrades, they would have to orbit 18 to 24 satellites.
The Soviets have continued developing and deploying radar-carrying satellite systems. Designed for mapping ice formations in polar regions, these satellites can greatly enhance the Soviet Navy's ability to operate in icebound areas by facilitating navigation of northern sea routes and assisting in such activities as routing naval ships from construction yards in the western USSR to new ports in the Pacific.
In July 1987, the Soviets orbited a very large, new type satellite using their PROTON booster rocket. According to the Soviets, COSMOS-1870 has an Earth-resources, remote-sensing mission, which reportedly includes experiments related to hydrology, cartography, geology, agriculture, and the environment. It uses an on board radar unit to gather data. Since no scientific data attributed to this spacecraft has even been discussed or publicly acknowledged to date, a strong military affiliation cannot be ruled out.
Manned Operations
The Soviet manned space program occupies a unique position in Moscow's space efforts. It is heavily publicized to promote the perception of the peaceful nature and technological superiority of the USSR's space program. Nonetheless, the Soviets have made a strong commitment to using their manned space program to accelerate their drive to achieve military superiority in space. For the Soviets, having a man in space provides unique observation, experimentation, execution,and command functions which the US frequently uses remote systems to perform.
Soviet literature indicates that the military applications of remote sensing, oceanography, meteorology, and geodesy have been the focus of repeated cosmonaut investigations. Even civil investigations such as astronomical observations, also performed by cosmonauts, have military uses. The USSR may be using such investigations to develop techniques useful for maintaining the orientation of certain equipment to an accuracy of a few arc-seconds, a capability needed to aim directed energy weapons.
The ability to rendezvous and link up with uncooperative spacecraft, which Soviet cosmonauts demonstrated in 1985 and 1986, also has military applications. Cosmonauts use equipment such as a laser range finder, a night-vision device, and an optical sensor while performing this type of operation. The Soviets state that this rendezvous procedure will allow the rescue of cosmonauts stranded in orbit, but it could also be useful both for repairing friendly satellites and for inspecting and disabling enemy satellites.
A crucial cosmonaut activity is Earth observation, which has applications for reconnaissance and targeting. The Soviets report that their cosmonauts have used visual observations, cameras, spectrometers, and multispectral electro-optical sensors in their observations from the SALYUT and MIR space stations. These experiments suggest the Soviets are evaluating their ability to locate, identify, and track targets from outer space. Developing this ability could be the first step toward designing a space weapons platform for use against targets in space and on Earth. Such a platform may eventually be used for ASAT and ballistic missile defense operations, as well as for space station defense.
In 1986, the USSR launched a new-generation space station MIR to replace the aging SALYUT-7. MIR is an impressive advancement over SALYUT-7, having enhanced solar energy and electrical power systems, greater computer capabilities, and individual"cabins" for crew members. Most significantly, while SALYUT-7 had only two docking ports, MIR has six.
With the launch of MIR, a space station module, and regular crew rotations with the SOYUZ-TM capsule, the Soviets have probably begun their permanent manned presence in space. The crew launched in February had a partial crew change in July 1987, and the remaining cosmonaut, Colonel Yuri Romanenko, was relieved in December 1987 after setting two space endurance records. In the early-to-mid 1990s, the Soviets should be able to construct a very large modular space station. They have discussed housing up to 100 cosmonauts in such a space complex.
Antisatellite Operations
In addition to space programs which could be construed as having both military and civilian applications, the Soviets have space systems that are purely military in nature. Indicative of the Soviet military program for space is their development and maintenance of the world's only currently operational ASAT system, a ground-based orbital interceptor. Using a radar sensor and a pellet-type warhead, the interceptor can attack all current low-altitude satellites. A target engagement during the first orbit of the intercept leaves little time for a target satellite to take evasive action. The interceptor can reach targets orbiting at an altitude of more than 5,000 kilometers, but it is probably intended for high-priority satellites at lower altitudes.
The ASAT interceptor is launched from Tyuratamon on SL-11 launch vehicles. Two launch pads, storage space for many interceptors, and the launch vehicles are available at the Tyuratam facility. Several interceptors could be launched each day from each of the pads.
Given the complexity of launch, target tracking, and radar-guided intercept, the Soviet ASAT system is far from primitive. Soviet ASAT tests have been largely successful, providing them with an operational system fully capable of performing its mission. Although the Soviets have not launched their ASAT system in several years, in an effort to forestall US development of an ASAT weapon, they have maintained their ASAT readiness. Over the past several years,the Soviets have routinely launched the SL-11 ASAT booster with other payloads, thereby ensuring the reliability of this system component. Other components can be tested on the ground without actually having to launch the ASAT system itself. The nuclear-armed GALOSH ABM also has an inherent ASAT capability against low-altitude satellites. The Soviet Union also has ground-based lasers with some capability to irradiate US satellites.
New Space Launch Systems
The Soviet space program's success is due largely to its versatile and reliable inventory of space launch vehicles (SLVs) and its space launch and support facilities. The Soviets send a satellite aloft every three or four days, using one of eight types of operational SLVs. The USSR's impressive ability to launch various spacecraft quickly gives the Soviets a distinct operational military advantage in any crisis. Most malfunctioning satellites could be rapidly replaced, and additional satellites could be launched to cover new or expanding areas in a crisis. In fact, if all deployed Soviet satellites were destroyed, the Soviets have sufficient standby lift capability to replace them within two to three months, provided reserve satellites were available.
Even with their current launch capability, the Sovietsare expanding their extensive family of SLVs with new expendable launch vehicles and reusable manned spacecraft. The deployment of the medium-lift Titan IIIC-Class SL-16 and the heavy-lift Saturn V-Class SL-X-17 will increase the payload weight of satellites the Soviets will be able to orbit.
On 15 May 1987, the Soviets conducted the first flight test of the SL-X-17, which they designated "Energiya"(Energy). They openly announced that "military experts took part in creating and testing" the new launch vehicle. The Soviets reported that "Energiya's" first stage (the strap-on boosters) and the second stage (the core vehicle) operated as planned. They also stated that an attempt was made to orbit a satellite during this test. The satellite mockup engines apparently did not function properly and the satellite splashed down in the Pacific Ocean. The failure of the payload, however, was not due to problems with the booster, which performed as intended.
The SL-X-17 heavy-lift vehicle will be used to launch the Soviet space shuttle orbiter as one of its payloads. Launch-pad compatibility testing of an orbiter attached to the SL-X-17 vehicle may already have taken place, and it appears that a test flight will occur soon. By using US propulsion, computer, materials, and airframe technology and designs, the Soviets were able to produce an orbiter years earlier, and at far less cost, than if they had depended solely on their own technology and engineering.
Development of a heavy-lift launch system with its main engines on the core vehicle rather than the orbiter gives the system the versatility to launch either an orbiter or other very heavy payloads. The SL-X17, for example, will be able to place payloads of over 100,000 kilograms into low-Earth orbit, a figure comparable to that carried by the discontinued US Saturn V rocket. Potential payloads for the SL-X-17 include modules for a large space station, components for manned and unmanned interplanetary missions, and perhaps directed-energy ASAT and ballistic missile defense weapons and other space-based components of the Soviet strategic defense program.
The SL-16 booster is capable of placing a payload of more than 15,000 kilograms into low-Earth orbit. This capability filled a gap in the Soviet SLV inventory by providing an economical means of launching medium weight payloads. One candidate payload for the SL-16 could be a space plane, a subscale version of which has been flight-tested in orbit; a full-scale test version is possibly in production. A small, manned spacecraft could be used for quick-reaction, real-time reconnaissance missions, satellite repairs and maintenance, crew transport, space station defense, satellite inspection and, if necessary, satellite destruction.
The introduction of the SL-16 and SL-X-17, coupled with an expected greater use of the SL-12 and SL-13SLVs, will increase substantially the payloads the Soviets will be capable of launching into space. In fact, during the next five years, the Soviets are expected to double the annual payload weight launched into orbit, and quadruple that weight within 15 years.
PROSPECTS
While the INF Treaty marks an important step in reducing the threat of nuclear war, the residual Soviet nuclear arsenal will still contain some 1,400 ICBMs, nearly 1,000 SLBMs, and a large number of cruise missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, and tactical missile and artillery systems.
Even if a strategic arms reduction treaty is concluded and ratified, the Soviets can be expected to continue to improve their strategic nuclear weapons, especially for accuracy, mobility, and survivability. Their short-range ballistic missile force, which is expected to grow steadily, will remain a potentially devastating strike force. Continued Soviet development of a new class of cruise missiles with greater accuracy than currently deployed ballistic missiles will enhance the deep-strike capability of theater bombers and increase bomber survivability by providing a standoff capability. Furthermore, the Soviets show no sign of abandoning any aspect of their strategic defense program, despite its approximate $20 billion per year cost.
Research and development trends suggest that the Soviets fully intend to use space for both offensive and defensive purposes. If current trends continue, space will become the fastest growing industry in both the military and civil sectors, although all available evidence suggests that military requirements drive the Soviet space program.
Sources : dia
Selasa, 22 Maret 2011
Selasa, 22 Februari 2011
6 Gripen from Sweden Land Today
New era for air force with modern jets
The arrival of six Gripen jet fighters today will usher in a modern era for the Royal Thai Air Force, commander Itthaporn Subhawong says.
The air force will take delivery of 12 Swedish-made Gripen fighters, worth almost 40 billion baht, after the cabinet approved the purchase of the jets in 2008 when Samak Sundaravej was the prime minister and defence minister.
The Gripen 39 C/D aircraft will replace the ageing F-5A/B jets. The F-5A/B aircraft will be completely phased out by the end of this year.
The first batch of the Gripen fighters is due to arrive at Don Muang air force base after flying out of Sweden on Feb18 and will be stationed at the Wing 7 air force base in Surat Thani.
The second batch of six Gripen jet fighters is scheduled to arrive next year.
ACM Itthaporn said yesterday he was convinced the jet fighters would bring modern and significant changes to the air force.With the fighters, the air force would be transformed to a network-oriented system, he said.
'The Gripen is like a new type of computer with all the modern stuff. Most importantly, the supplier has agreed to transfer all the technology to us,'' ACM Itthaporn said, adding that software for the fighters could be constantly updated.
He said the capabilities of fighter pilots would have to change completely as the new system on the jets would provide them with flight information linked to the other fighters on a screen before them.
ACM Itthaporn said the US had allowed the Secos-link system on the Gripen fighters to link with the system of the US-made F16 fighters.
An air force source said permission was obtained after Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva raised the matter with US President Barack Obama during his visit to the US last month.
ACM Itthaporn said the air force was working closely with the navy to develop a data link system because the two forces would soon hold a joint military exercise and information on the Gripen fighters would be hooked up with navy ships.
The frigate HTMS Naresuan would be the first to be linked with the fighters, he said.
ACM Itthaporn said a Saab 340 Erieye airborne early warning aircraft that the air force also bought from the Swedish government would be connected to all the Gripen fighters.
The Saab 340 aircraft is now stationed at Wing 7 air force base.
He said the air force had also spent about 1.1 billion baht on building a hangar for the Gripen jets and the Saab 340 aircraft as well as ground stations and ground logistics support systems.
ACM Itthaporn said he would conduct test flights of the six Gripen jet fighters that would be delivered today.
The air force chief conducted test flights of Gripen fighters in Sweden in 2004 when he was chief of the directorate of RTAF operations.
The air force later decided to purchase the 12 Gripen fighters in 2007 and submitted a request to the cabinet the following year.
He said a cabinet meeting on Feb 15 also approved a budget of about 6.9billion baht to be spent on an upgrade for the air force's six F16 jet fighters that would be stationed at Wing 4, Takhli air force base in Nakhon Sawan province.
He thanked Prime Minister Abhisit for throwing his support behind the project and said the premier had a good understanding of the air force's needs.
''We are not getting any commission from the purchase of the air force jet fighters,'' ACM Itthaporn said.
The arrival of six Gripen jet fighters today will usher in a modern era for the Royal Thai Air Force, commander Itthaporn Subhawong says.
The air force will take delivery of 12 Swedish-made Gripen fighters, worth almost 40 billion baht, after the cabinet approved the purchase of the jets in 2008 when Samak Sundaravej was the prime minister and defence minister.
The Gripen 39 C/D aircraft will replace the ageing F-5A/B jets. The F-5A/B aircraft will be completely phased out by the end of this year.
The first batch of the Gripen fighters is due to arrive at Don Muang air force base after flying out of Sweden on Feb18 and will be stationed at the Wing 7 air force base in Surat Thani.
The second batch of six Gripen jet fighters is scheduled to arrive next year.
ACM Itthaporn said yesterday he was convinced the jet fighters would bring modern and significant changes to the air force.With the fighters, the air force would be transformed to a network-oriented system, he said.
'The Gripen is like a new type of computer with all the modern stuff. Most importantly, the supplier has agreed to transfer all the technology to us,'' ACM Itthaporn said, adding that software for the fighters could be constantly updated.
He said the capabilities of fighter pilots would have to change completely as the new system on the jets would provide them with flight information linked to the other fighters on a screen before them.
ACM Itthaporn said the US had allowed the Secos-link system on the Gripen fighters to link with the system of the US-made F16 fighters.
An air force source said permission was obtained after Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva raised the matter with US President Barack Obama during his visit to the US last month.
ACM Itthaporn said the air force was working closely with the navy to develop a data link system because the two forces would soon hold a joint military exercise and information on the Gripen fighters would be hooked up with navy ships.
The frigate HTMS Naresuan would be the first to be linked with the fighters, he said.
ACM Itthaporn said a Saab 340 Erieye airborne early warning aircraft that the air force also bought from the Swedish government would be connected to all the Gripen fighters.
The Saab 340 aircraft is now stationed at Wing 7 air force base.
He said the air force had also spent about 1.1 billion baht on building a hangar for the Gripen jets and the Saab 340 aircraft as well as ground stations and ground logistics support systems.
ACM Itthaporn said he would conduct test flights of the six Gripen jet fighters that would be delivered today.
The air force chief conducted test flights of Gripen fighters in Sweden in 2004 when he was chief of the directorate of RTAF operations.
The air force later decided to purchase the 12 Gripen fighters in 2007 and submitted a request to the cabinet the following year.
He said a cabinet meeting on Feb 15 also approved a budget of about 6.9billion baht to be spent on an upgrade for the air force's six F16 jet fighters that would be stationed at Wing 4, Takhli air force base in Nakhon Sawan province.
He thanked Prime Minister Abhisit for throwing his support behind the project and said the premier had a good understanding of the air force's needs.
''We are not getting any commission from the purchase of the air force jet fighters,'' ACM Itthaporn said.
Senin, 21 Februari 2011
Spy Behind the Weapons Procurement of Indonesia
NIS Behind Break-In at Indonesian Delegation
Three intruders who broke into the room of Indonesian presidential envoys at Seoul's Lotte Hotel on the morning of Feb. 16 were agents from the National Intelligence Service, it has emerged. A high-ranking government official said the NIS "tried to find out the negotiation strategy of the Indonesian delegation in pursuit of the national interest. It was an unintended consequence that they were caught."
Soon after some 50 Indonesian officials including Indonesia's Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Hatta Rajasa left for Cheong Wa Dae to meet President Lee Myung-bak, two men and a women broke into the room on the 19th floor of the Lotte Hotel, but they were surprised by one of the Indonesian officials while they were looking into laptops there and fled. It is uncertain whether the agents copied data from the laptop.
The NIS agents were apparently desperate to obtain Indonesia's negotiation strategy for the purchase of Korea's T-50 Golden Eagle supersonic trainer jet, K2 Black Panther main battle tank, and portable surface-to-air missile. Korea is in fierce competition with Russia's Yak-130 trainer jet.
The government has been working hard to win an export deal after negotiations with the United Arab Emirates and Singapore faltered. One T-50 is priced at US$25 million, and the government aims to export 1,000 by 2030.
A government official said, "It seems that NIS took way too much risk due to this obsession with the export of the T-50." An intelligence official claimed it is "an open secret" that intelligence agencies of every country are engaged in a highly sophisticated battle for intelligence. "After the intrusion was reported in the media, the NIS exerted a great deal of effort through many channels to smooth over the situation," he added.
Police said earlier that due to the low resolution of the CCTV at the Lotte Hotel, they were unable to identify the intruders.
Sources : chosun
Three intruders who broke into the room of Indonesian presidential envoys at Seoul's Lotte Hotel on the morning of Feb. 16 were agents from the National Intelligence Service, it has emerged. A high-ranking government official said the NIS "tried to find out the negotiation strategy of the Indonesian delegation in pursuit of the national interest. It was an unintended consequence that they were caught."
Soon after some 50 Indonesian officials including Indonesia's Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Hatta Rajasa left for Cheong Wa Dae to meet President Lee Myung-bak, two men and a women broke into the room on the 19th floor of the Lotte Hotel, but they were surprised by one of the Indonesian officials while they were looking into laptops there and fled. It is uncertain whether the agents copied data from the laptop.
The NIS agents were apparently desperate to obtain Indonesia's negotiation strategy for the purchase of Korea's T-50 Golden Eagle supersonic trainer jet, K2 Black Panther main battle tank, and portable surface-to-air missile. Korea is in fierce competition with Russia's Yak-130 trainer jet.
The government has been working hard to win an export deal after negotiations with the United Arab Emirates and Singapore faltered. One T-50 is priced at US$25 million, and the government aims to export 1,000 by 2030.
A government official said, "It seems that NIS took way too much risk due to this obsession with the export of the T-50." An intelligence official claimed it is "an open secret" that intelligence agencies of every country are engaged in a highly sophisticated battle for intelligence. "After the intrusion was reported in the media, the NIS exerted a great deal of effort through many channels to smooth over the situation," he added.
Police said earlier that due to the low resolution of the CCTV at the Lotte Hotel, they were unable to identify the intruders.
Sources : chosun
Sabtu, 19 Februari 2011
Singapore Military Procures BullsEye
TAIPEI - Singapore's Ministry of Defense will procure the next-generation Super BullsEye II Advanced Weapons Scoring System built by Singapore-based Stratech Systems Limited for $1.14 million. Stratech made the announcement on Feb. 16.
"This contract covers the supply, delivery, installation, testing and commissioning of an integrated bomb and gunnery scoring system," Stratech officials said.
The BullsEye II is an advanced weapons scoring system that fully automates the scoring, recording and management of firing results in weapons training and defense exercises. The system can be used for the army, navy or air force and is configurable for different terrains.
"Stratech has been in the forefront of advanced technologies," said David K.M. Chew, executive chairman. The company is principally engaged in the design, development, integration, implementation, maintenance and project management of information technology and advanced technology systems.
BullsEye is powered by Stratech's proprietary Intelligence Vision technologies, which is a "proven product that has been deployed and currently used by air forces and navies from several countries," according to a company press release. "The automated scoring system is capable of accurately scoring weapons impact day or night for air, sea and land forces and weapons development agencies."
In August 2009, the company sold the BullsEye II system to South Korea.
Sources : defencenews
"This contract covers the supply, delivery, installation, testing and commissioning of an integrated bomb and gunnery scoring system," Stratech officials said.
The BullsEye II is an advanced weapons scoring system that fully automates the scoring, recording and management of firing results in weapons training and defense exercises. The system can be used for the army, navy or air force and is configurable for different terrains.
"Stratech has been in the forefront of advanced technologies," said David K.M. Chew, executive chairman. The company is principally engaged in the design, development, integration, implementation, maintenance and project management of information technology and advanced technology systems.
BullsEye is powered by Stratech's proprietary Intelligence Vision technologies, which is a "proven product that has been deployed and currently used by air forces and navies from several countries," according to a company press release. "The automated scoring system is capable of accurately scoring weapons impact day or night for air, sea and land forces and weapons development agencies."
In August 2009, the company sold the BullsEye II system to South Korea.
Sources : defencenews
Jumat, 18 Februari 2011
First Australian LHD Launched in Spain
The hull of the first of the Royal Australian Navy’s two new amphibious ships has been launched in Spain, heralding a new era for Australia’s amphibious capability (all photos : Australian DoD)
LHD launch paves the way for amphibious transformation
The hull of the first of the Royal Australian Navy’s two new amphibious ships has been launched in Spain, heralding a new era for Australia’s amphibious capability.
Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Russ Crane, led the launch and said the event was enormously significant.
“These ships are officially known as Landing Helicopter Docks or LHDs and are the largest the Australian Navy has ever owned,” Vice Admiral Crane said.
LHD01's hull launch was held at the Navantia dockyards at Ferrol in northern Spain; the event having a distinct Australian feel as children of Australian diplomats joined the official delegation waving Australian flags.
A Canberra regional sparkling wine was broken over the Canberra Class ship’s hull.
Vicki Coates, wife of the late Rear Admiral Nigel Coates who commanded the previous HMAS Canberra, was the ‘launch lady’.
Vice Admiral Crane said with a new generation in technology would come a new way of thinking in terms of how Navy would operate and crew this new capability.
“We are well progressed in our planning for the LHD arrival,” he said.
“I am confident we will have the people and the knowhow by the time the first LHD comes on line.
“Most importantly, for now, this project is on time and on budget.” Both ships will be based at Garden Island in Sydney. Crewed by all three services, the LHD will mark a significant strengthening of the ADF’s amphibious capability and tri-service culture.
First of class, HMAS Canberra (LHD01) will arrive in Victoria next year where it will be fitted out before being accepted into service in 2014 with sister ship HMAS Adelaide (LHD02) to follow the year after.
Sources : defence.gov.au
F-35 for RAAF Will Be Arrived On Time on 2014
Company officials said in Canberra yesterday the RAAF should have a squadron of 14 of the fighter bombers by 2018, as planned.
The government says it wants to buy up to 100 multi-role JSFs to replace the retired F-111 bombers and the RAAF's F/A-18 Hornet fighter-bombers.
The first two JSFs, now designated the F-35 Lightning ll, will be used to train Australian pilots and ground crew in the US.
The Lockheed Martin officials said yesterday they had won the $3.5 billion contract to supply the navy's new helicopter that will replace its ageing Seahawks.
The company has teamed up with US helicopter firm Sikorsky to offer the new MH-60R Seahawk, or Romeo, and is competing with Eurocopter's NH90 NFH, or NATO Frigate Helicopter.
The officials said they could offer the Australian government a deal whereby the American companies would take back the older helicopters to be refurbished and sold to customers who needed helicopters for less demanding roles.
Lockheed Martin also announced yesterday it has appointed retired naval officer Raydon Gates as chief executive for Lockheed Martin Australia.
Sources : theaustralia
Singapore to Raise Defence Budget by 5.4%
The government plans to spend S$12.08 billion (US$9.5 billion) on defence in the 2011 fiscal year, up from S$11.46 billion the year before.
Singapore's navy, army and air force will get S$11.53 billion to buy and maintain military equipment, for the upkeep of camps and for payment of salaries.
The city-state currently has a population of more than five million, a quarter of whom are foreigners.
Singapore's economy grew 14.5 percent in 2010, the fastest in Asia.
The defence budget is about five per cent of gross domestic product.
Sources : channelnewsasia
Kamis, 17 Februari 2011
Gates: China stealth fighter trails U.S. planes
WASHINGTON — The United States will retain a far bigger fleet of top-end fighter planes than China for years to come despite Beijing’s early test of a stealth-style jet that has stoked concern over its military buildup, the U.S. defense chief said Thursday
Defense Secretary Robert Gates told lawmakers that China faces a “long road” before deploying its J-20 stealth fighter in any numbers, and predicted a continuing “huge disparity” compared with America’s fleet of low-observable aircraft.
The chief of the Pacific Command, Adm. Robert Willard, acknowledged that China also has a “formidable” ballistic missile capability that has grown for two decades.
Willard said the United States was watching “very carefully,” and it was important for China to be open and hold a dialogue with the U.S. and other countries in the region about its intentions.
“If the two militaries are coming into contact with each other at the rate they are, then it’s important that my commanders on the high seas or my mission commanders in the air have enough familiarity with that counterpart military not to misjudge, miscommunicate or misunderstand,” he told journalists, alluding to concerns that a chance confrontation could spark conflict.
China’s military buildup has caused unease among its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific, with whom it has territorial disputes. China’s buildup also has raised questions about how long the United States can retain its military predominance in the region, which Washington views as vital for stability and policing sea lanes that keep for international trade moving.
China’s arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles, including one designed to target an aircraft carrier, and its growing surface and submarine fleet, could potentially constrain U.S. operations in waters of the western Pacific, although Willard maintained that China’s capabilities had not necessitated a rethinking of America’s military strategy for the region.
The U.S. Pacific Fleet alone includes five aircraft carrier strike groups, approximately 180 ships, 1,500 aircraft and 100,000 personnel.
China maintains that it has no offensive intentions, and sees its military capabilities as in keeping with its rising economic and diplomatic influence.
In a move seen by some as flagging the communist nation’s clout, however, China staged a test flight of its stealth jet during a visit by Gates to Beijing in January aimed at rekindling military ties.
Beijing had severed contacts earlier in response to the latest U.S. announcement of arms sales to Taiwan.
Gates told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the test flight was between half and one year earlier than U.S. intelligence estimates. He played down its significance, saying the United States would retain far more “fifth generation” fighter jets than China for years.
“There’s still a huge disparity in terms of these aircraft,” Gates said. “This is their first low-observable aircraft and given the challenges we have had, and we have been at this for more than 20 years, they have a long road in front of them before this becomes a serious operational aircraft in any numbers.”
He said China may have 50 of the aircraft deployed by 2020, and a couple of hundred by 2025.
Despite rolling back acquisition of top-end F-35 jets for five years as part of budget cuts, Gates said the United States still will have 325 F-35 jets by the end of 2016, and in addition to its F-22 jets, would have in all about 850 fifth-generation aircraft by 2020.
He predicted the number would rise to 1,500 by 2025.
Sources : airforcetimes
Defense Secretary Robert Gates told lawmakers that China faces a “long road” before deploying its J-20 stealth fighter in any numbers, and predicted a continuing “huge disparity” compared with America’s fleet of low-observable aircraft.
The chief of the Pacific Command, Adm. Robert Willard, acknowledged that China also has a “formidable” ballistic missile capability that has grown for two decades.
Willard said the United States was watching “very carefully,” and it was important for China to be open and hold a dialogue with the U.S. and other countries in the region about its intentions.
“If the two militaries are coming into contact with each other at the rate they are, then it’s important that my commanders on the high seas or my mission commanders in the air have enough familiarity with that counterpart military not to misjudge, miscommunicate or misunderstand,” he told journalists, alluding to concerns that a chance confrontation could spark conflict.
China’s military buildup has caused unease among its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific, with whom it has territorial disputes. China’s buildup also has raised questions about how long the United States can retain its military predominance in the region, which Washington views as vital for stability and policing sea lanes that keep for international trade moving.
China’s arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles, including one designed to target an aircraft carrier, and its growing surface and submarine fleet, could potentially constrain U.S. operations in waters of the western Pacific, although Willard maintained that China’s capabilities had not necessitated a rethinking of America’s military strategy for the region.
The U.S. Pacific Fleet alone includes five aircraft carrier strike groups, approximately 180 ships, 1,500 aircraft and 100,000 personnel.
China maintains that it has no offensive intentions, and sees its military capabilities as in keeping with its rising economic and diplomatic influence.
In a move seen by some as flagging the communist nation’s clout, however, China staged a test flight of its stealth jet during a visit by Gates to Beijing in January aimed at rekindling military ties.
Beijing had severed contacts earlier in response to the latest U.S. announcement of arms sales to Taiwan.
Gates told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the test flight was between half and one year earlier than U.S. intelligence estimates. He played down its significance, saying the United States would retain far more “fifth generation” fighter jets than China for years.
“There’s still a huge disparity in terms of these aircraft,” Gates said. “This is their first low-observable aircraft and given the challenges we have had, and we have been at this for more than 20 years, they have a long road in front of them before this becomes a serious operational aircraft in any numbers.”
He said China may have 50 of the aircraft deployed by 2020, and a couple of hundred by 2025.
Despite rolling back acquisition of top-end F-35 jets for five years as part of budget cuts, Gates said the United States still will have 325 F-35 jets by the end of 2016, and in addition to its F-22 jets, would have in all about 850 fifth-generation aircraft by 2020.
He predicted the number would rise to 1,500 by 2025.
Sources : airforcetimes
Israeli PM: Don't doubt Israel's ability
At a ceremony marking Martyrs Resistance Day in Lebanon, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah warned in a televised speech Wednesday that if a war is imposed on Lebanon his fighters will liberate the Galilee.
"I say to the fighters of the Islamic resistance -- be ready. If a new war is imposed on Lebanon we may ask you to take the Galilee, to free the Galilee," Nasrallah declared.
"Whoever hides in a bunker should stay in the bunker," Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said referring to Nasrallah, who since the Second Lebanon War rarely appears in public and broadcasts all his speeches to his followers from his bunker.
The Netanyahu response to the Hezbollah leader's threats at a Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations in Jerusalem was aired on national television networks.
"Nasrallah said he would capture the Galilee, I have news for you -- you won't," Netanyahu said. "No one should doubt Israel's strength or its ability to defend itself. "We have a strong army and we are a people of strong resolve. We seek peace with all of our neighbors, but the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] is prepared to defend Israel from any of its enemies," Netanyahu declared.
Marking the third anniversary of the death of his deputy Imad Mughniyeh, killed by a car bomb in Damascus in February 2008, the Hezbollah chief warned his blood was not spent in vain and his death will be avenged.
"I want to assure you and tell the Israelis that they should be careful because the blood of Imad Mugniyeh will not go to waste," Nasrallah said in footage broadcast on Israel's Second Channel Wednesday night.
Israel this week stepped up security at its embassies abroad amid Hezbollah's threats to target Israeli interests due to the third anniversary of Mughniyeh's death. The Israeli government temporarily shut down four embassies and advised diplomats from those missions to remain in their homes.
Sources : upi
Rabu, 16 Februari 2011
Navy: Bahrain protests not affecting U.S. base
STUTTGART, Germany — It remains business as usual for U.S. military personnel stationed in Bahrain, where thousands of demonstrators have been staging protests against their autocratic government.
Raucous demonstrations continued Wednesday on the streets of Bahrain, but Navy officials said there has been no sign that the crowds intend to direct their hostility toward the roughly 4,200 servicemembers who live and work in the country.
“The protests are not directed at the U.S. military presence,” said Jennifer Stride, a spokeswoman for U.S. Naval Support Activity Bahrain. She added that the protests are not taking place in the vicinity of the naval base.
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Bahrain, a strategically vital nation that hosts the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet, is the latest Arab nation to experience massive political upheaval and calls for democratic reform. Fifth Fleet’s area of responsibility includes the Arabian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, parts of the Indian Ocean and several important shipping lanes.
According to NSA Bahrain, there are 2,250 military and civilians who live off base among the population. Currently, there are no plans to relocate those sailors and civilians to temporary housing on base, Stride said.
“Our Sailors, civilian personnel and family members have been advised to avoid sites where the protests are occurring,” Stride said in an e-mail to Stars and Stripes. “There is no indication that providing any refuge on base is necessary.”
Stride declined to say if additional safety measures are being taken on base, explaining that force protection postures are not discussed publicly.
“We do not have any information at this time that suggests that planned protests are likely to cause significant disruptions,” Stride said. “We will continue to monitor the situation.”
Raucous demonstrations continued Wednesday on the streets of Bahrain, but Navy officials said there has been no sign that the crowds intend to direct their hostility toward the roughly 4,200 servicemembers who live and work in the country.
“The protests are not directed at the U.S. military presence,” said Jennifer Stride, a spokeswoman for U.S. Naval Support Activity Bahrain. She added that the protests are not taking place in the vicinity of the naval base.
Advertisement
Bahrain, a strategically vital nation that hosts the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet, is the latest Arab nation to experience massive political upheaval and calls for democratic reform. Fifth Fleet’s area of responsibility includes the Arabian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, parts of the Indian Ocean and several important shipping lanes.
According to NSA Bahrain, there are 2,250 military and civilians who live off base among the population. Currently, there are no plans to relocate those sailors and civilians to temporary housing on base, Stride said.
“Our Sailors, civilian personnel and family members have been advised to avoid sites where the protests are occurring,” Stride said in an e-mail to Stars and Stripes. “There is no indication that providing any refuge on base is necessary.”
Stride declined to say if additional safety measures are being taken on base, explaining that force protection postures are not discussed publicly.
“We do not have any information at this time that suggests that planned protests are likely to cause significant disruptions,” Stride said. “We will continue to monitor the situation.”
A Germany-Soviet Military-Economic Comparison by Arvo L. Vecamer
To win in an armed conflict, a nation must be able to optimally supply one’s own forces both in offensive and defensive situations. Germany was able to (reasonably) supply her forces with military supplies in the early years of the war, when she fought a series of small, quick action campaigns. But after 1942, Germany could no longer provide her armed forces with the needed military supplies. Quick campaigns gave way to a prolonged war. The Soviet Union however could supply her army with the needed materials and the United States was indeed the global Arsenal of Democracy.
Since Adolf Hitler and the German Nationalist Socialist party came to power in 1933, Germany was both economically and militarily preparing for war. German military officials studied the failures of the last World War, recommended corrective measures and developed new combat techniques, which would deliver a proverbial deadly knockout punch as early as possible in any future conflict. German propaganda specialists made sure that all of Germany’s future opponents also believed that Germany was militarily superior to one and all.
In reality, Germany was not prepared for war in 1939. The German economy of the 1930’s continued to satisfy both civilian and military requirements, even after September of 1939 when production should have shifted to military needs. Hitler believed that he could have it both ways, “Kanonen und Butter” - that is, satisfying the civilian population at home by not placing restrictions on their consumer product consumption, while at the same time satisfying the production needs of Germany's military forces. In fact, Germany was not geared for total war production until 1944. This indicates that German economic and military resource management efforts were not optimally configured for a nation at war previous to that time, and in 1944, the tide had already long since turned.
For example, in FY 1942, Germany produced 30 million tons of steel - but only 8 million tons of that was directed towards military production efforts (airplanes, guns, munitions, supplies, tanks, etc.). The following chart highlights German steel production allocations for the fourth quarter of 1939:
Heer - 3.060.000 tons
Marine - 1.250.000 tons
Luftwaffe - 2.220.000 tons
Military construction - 2.060.000 tons
Total military - 8.590.000 tons
Civilian sector - 7.320.000 tons
Export - 1.730.000 tons
Total civilian - 9.050.000 tons
Total steel - 17.640.000 tons
The civilian sector thus consumed 41.5% of the total German steel production in the fourth quarter of 1939. By the fourth quarter of 1940, the civilian sector “only” consumed 40.8% of the steel output. When Speer reorganized the German economy when Fritz Todt died and he replaced him, it is clear to see where the slack came from.
In terms of human resources, Germany should have increased the hours of a workday to way beyond a regular “9-5” day early in the war. Women were not considered as a serious alternative work force until late in the war either. In 1939, German industries utilized 2.62 million women. In July of 1944, German industries still only utilized 2.67 million women. This average was maintained from 1939 to 1944.
In terms of manufacturing/production related intricacies, the Germans too made a number of long-term calculation errors. For example, the Germans would begin to produce one type of a weapons system (say a Pz IV), then, for whatever reason, added to or modified the basic production model within a very short period of time (the Pz IV came in a myriad of variants as time progressed). This “upgrading” only served to slow down the total number of units which could be produced in the long run. Standardized production equals mass quantaties. The Germans should have produced the Pz IV in just one or two variants and produce them as much as possible, just like the Soviets with their T-34 production. German tanks utilized more complex gasoline engines (higher maintenance and production costs); Soviet tanks ran on very basic diesel engines (and also less flammable when hit). Here too, the Germans realized their error in 1941, but it was too late to convert the German economy over to diesel engines.
From 1939 to 1941, Germany used her now well refined Blitzkrieg tactics to conquer Poland, Denmark, Norway, the BeNeLux nations, France, the Balkan, and so on. The end goal was to obtain a German victory through the utilization of the minimum quantities of men, materials and supplies as possible, and in the shortest time. This worked quite well in the early years of WWII. If there was a chance to win the war, it was most probable during the summer and fall of 1941 provided that the existing resources were not squandered or misused.
But in 1941, the Germans came up against a proverbial brick wall - their summer and fall offensive against the Soviet Union stalled. The winter season arrived with bitterly cold temperatures. Interestingly, on 16 August 1941, General Keitel and the Wehrmachts-Waffenämter agreed that Germany reduce its military production efforts in the fall of 1941. Both were so sure that Germany had defeated the Soviet Union, and Hitler concurred. Then came November and December of 1941. In short, the Germans had not adequately prepared for an extended winter campaign. One of the negative consequences was that many Wehrmacht infantrymen and tankers suffered accordingly (of note is that the Luftwaffe and the KM had sent proper winter clothing to most of their troops in the east).
In the end, Germany’s excellent military leadership and her many technical advantages were not enough to overcome the economic advantages of her enemies. From the very beginning, Germany should have been able to exploit many of her economic and technology advantages far more optimally. Placing Herman Göring in charge of domestic economic planning was not the wisest of selections either. While Albert Speer did achieve some very impressive production increases in 1943, 1944 and 1945 (he became Armaments Minister on 18 February 1942, replacing Fritz Todt), the German efforts were essentially a day late and a dollar short.
Germany lost the Second World War not because of any single military action, she lost it primarily to a war of economic and human attrition.
The Soviet Union took a different approach to the economic situation of the pre-war era. According to I.K. Malanin, a Soviet military history writer; the following six factors determine a nation’s ability to win or lose a war:
# The economic base
# The technological competence of the nation
# The established military doctrines and existing military traditions
# The geographic environment
# The ability and the experience of her personnel
# The comparative power of the enemy
The economic base: An economic base must be sufficiently developed to survive a prolonged conflict. The Soviet Union had built up a much more effective and reliable economic infrastructure since the 1920’s when compared to the German economy. It was more optimally geared for mass production of simple, yet reliable (military) goods and products. Throughout the Second World War, Soviet military forces never really suffered from serious supply problems, Soviet production centers continued to pour out what was needed on the front lines. But the Germans often suffered from supply shortages. In addition to their own production capabilities, the Soviet Union also obtained significant quantities of U.S. and British lend-lease aid as can be seen a few paragraphs down.
The technological competence of the nation: Technical expertise must be available to run existing equipment and to develop “this generation and the next generation” of military hardware. In this field, the Soviet Union obtained the needed expertise from abroad. Many state-of-the-art military technologies were in part, provided to the Soviet Union by the Germans. One need only recall the secret German-Soviet military bases, which operated in the Soviet Union in the 1920’s. While the Germans certainly learned much from those experiences, so did the next generation of Soviet military leaders. In addition to the secret bases, both Germany and the United States provided the bulk of the industrial and technical production competencies to the Soviet Union through the myriad of “economic assistance” contracts signed by the Soviet government with such American industrialists as Armand Hammer, Henry Ford, etc. Actual combat competence in the Soviet military was obtained by fighting the Spanish, Japanese, Polish, Finnish and German armies.
How significant was the American contribution to the Soviet war effort of WW2? Let us look at the Soviet car manufacturing industry of the pre-war era as but one example. The following table might help to place some U.S. contributions into a more optimal perspective:
AMO vehicles - Moscow plant - assistance through Brandt.
GAZ vehicles - Molotov Nr. 1, Gorky plant - assistance through Austin and Ford.
GAZ vehicles - Nizhni-Novgorod plant - assistance through Austin and Ford.
YAZ vehicles - Yaroslav plant - assistance through Hercules.
ZIS vehicles - Kuznetsk plant - assistance through Autocar and Brandt.
On 31 May 1929, Henry Ford and the Ford Corporation signed a contract allowing the Soviet Union to construct GAZ-A cars and GAZ-AA trucks at the Nizhni-Novgorod plant. U.S. engineers directed the construction of the factory and Ford provided most of the tools and jigs. Soviet engineers were sent to Ford’s Rogue River plant near Detroit to study U.S. automotive engineering methodologies (Ford basically told the Soviets the economics behind mass production techniques, American style). The Austin Company, Cleveland, OH, provided the Soviets with assistance for the construction of the AMO-3 two and a half ton trucks.
The ZIS-5 and ZIS-6 trucks were copies of the U.S. Autocar trucks. Holley carburetors (Holley Carburetors Co., Detroit, MI) were built at the Samara carburetor and motor plant after 1932. The Yaroslav tire plant was patterned after the Seiberling tire plant in Akron, OH. Of interest is that 34% of all trucks manufactured by the Soviet Union during the war were made at the Molotov Nr. 1 plant in Gorky; the GAZ-M trucks produced there being a direct copy of the 1934 Ford truck.
Because of the United States and all of the economic help it (and Germany to a lesser extent) provided to the Soviet Union during the 1930’s, the Soviet Union essentially advanced technologically 50 years in only an eight to 10 year span. When the U.S. engineers and specialists were forced to leave in the late 1930’s (some were never allowed to leave the Soviet Union despite the fact they were U.S. citizens), the Soviets were really only left with one realistic economic option - continue to utilize the basic systems and the mass production methodologies the Americans had left behind. And that is what they did during the Second World War. They were understandably crude copies of their American counterparts, but never-the-less, they were effective copies.
The Germans were not able to copy the American production methodologies; though they clearly analyzed and studied them very extensively. German factories were not designed for “mass” mass production. The American and the German economies of scale were so much different. In addition, the Allied air war forced the Germans to increasingly scale down the size of all of their production facilities and disperse them to prevent them from being bombed. By 1942/1943, just when the Germans needed it most, it was no longer possible for them to produce “one item” from start to finish under one roof.
The aviation sector can serve as but one example. From the European perspective in 1939, flying 400 miles (640 km), from Frankfurt to London - that was a “long” distance flight. And thus, many European fighter a/c of the early World War Two era were built with these “long distance” flights in mind. From the American perspective, flying 400 miles (640 km), from Los Angeles to San Francisco - that was a little puddle hopper flight. Flying 2.500 miles (4.000 km) from New York to Seattle - that was “long distance” flight. And thus, U.S. a/c were built primarily with U.S. type distances in mind.
The established military doctrines and existing military traditions: This was a rather unique situation for the Soviets in 1939. A great percentage of their soldiers had been trained during the Czarist era. The Soviets melded many traditional Czarist era military traditions with new, “Soviet” ones; as the war progressed, more and more older “traditions” were re-introduced into the Soviet military. Mobile warfare was learned by reading and studying western (primarily British and German) combat philosophies and learning from actual combat situations, such as fighting the Spaniards, the Japanese, the Finns and the Germans.
The geographic environment: Not much one can say here. A nation has what it has in terms of geographic features and that’s pretty much it. But, one can use geographic advantages to help alleviate military disadvantages. If you can, draw the enemy deep into your country - extend his logistical capabilities way beyond the norm - trade land for time to rebuild you armed forces, etc. - these thoughts and more were prime Soviet methodologies of the pre-war and war era.
The ability and the experience of her personnel: While the Soviet military truly worked on reforming itself in the 1930’s, the many purges also severely weakened the aggregate experience level of her military personnel. This placed the Soviet Union at a severely disadvantageous position in June of 1941. Only by 1943 and 1944, did the Soviet soldiers reach general parity with their German counterparts; and even then, the average German soldier held many competence and experience advantages over many of opponents.
The comparative power of the enemy: Since the 1930’s, the Germany and the Soviet Union were engaged in an arms race. After first investing heavily in building up an industrial base, starting in approximately 1937, the Soviet Union’s economy switched over to the production of military goods. But the Germans had a bit of an early lead - they started the arms race in 1933 (earlier in secret). From 1939 to approximately 1941/42, the German military economy retained a distinct advantage in both quality and quantity when compared to same of her opponents. By 1943, the Soviet Union had caught up and began to surpass the German production capabilities.
Allied lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union during the Second World War was also a factor in the Soviet economic and military situation during WWII. The United States provided the Soviet Union with approximately USD 11 billion in aid. Great Britain and Canada provided the Soviet Union with an additional USD 6 billion in aid. Both figures are for USD values in 1945. Since 1945, Soviet historians have tended to downplay the significance of Allied lend-lease efforts - it is unequivocably accepted that in the end, over 20 million Soviet citizens needlessly lost their lives in the conflict, lend-lease aid or not. But Allied lend-lease aid did make a difference, even if only a small one, to the Soviet war effort, as can be seen in the below paragraphs.
As soon as the German Army crossed into the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, Stalin asked Churchill (and Roosevelt) for military assistance. Both agreed to provide it (not only in the form of military supplies, but after December of 1941, also in the form of opening up a “second” front in the west). The first lend-lease convoys to in fact depart for the Soviet Union, did so before any formal document had been signed between the Soviets and the Western Allies. It need be noted that although the United States was not officially at war with Germany, the U.S. agreed to help supply the Soviet Union with lend-lease aid. The promised supplies were agreed to in a series of protocols. The Soviet Union would receive goods and supplies up front, and it could repay its debts at the end of the war in cash or negotiable bonds (plus a small interest charge for late or non-payments).
On 06 October 1941, Winston Churchill advised Josef Stalin that a British convoy would depart from the west every 10 days. The first official convoy, PQ 1, departed from Iceland bound for Archangel (Archanglesk). It carried 20 tanks and 193 fighter a/c. It, as well as the next few PQ’s made it safely to and from the Soviet Union with their freight. It need be noted that in February of 1942, British lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union received a higher priority level than supplying British Home-Guard units and Commonwealth forces operating in the Pacific with military goods. Thus, badly needed Hurricane fighters went to the VVS, not to the RAF in Burma.
The Allied lend-lease aid effort was truly a monumental undertaking. During the course of the Second World War, the Western Allies sent 811 ships to Soviet ports filled with lend-lease aid. The Germans sank 58 of those ships. 33 of the 811 ships returned to port (mechanical breakdowns; damaged by a German attack, but able to proceed under their own power; etc.).
Murmansk and Vladivostok were among the most utilized ports. The route over the Pacific was safer, but it also took longer. Allied convoys had to first cross the Pacific, then the lend-lease aid goods had to traverse Siberia via train. Initially, Iran was hardly used as a trans-shipment route. The existing infrastructure needed to transport lend-lease goods to the Soviet Union was not optimal. After 1943, when the Allies developed better transportation networks in Iran and the Middle East in general, the Persian route became a more critical link. Of all the lend-lease aid, approximately 50% was delivered via the Pacific, 25% via Persia and 25% via the northern route to Archangel and Murmansk.
If the Allies were not well prepared to initiate lend-lease support to the Soviet Union in 1941, so was the Soviet Union not in an optimal position to accept the aid. Interestingly, in August of 1941, the heaviest crane at Murmansk could only lift an 11-ton load. The British had to quickly supply the Soviets with a heavier crane to help speed up the lend-lease off-loading efforts. The RAF also provided aerial support to protect Murmansk from the Luftwaffe. With VVS approval, the 151st RAF Wing arrived at their new base in Vaenga (about 20 miles out of Murmansk) in August of 1941 with 24 Hurricanes (15 additional Hurricane a/c were shipped in crates to Vaenga).
The first PQ’s arrived safely in the Soviet Union with their precious freight. But the Germans reacted quickly by sending both Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe units against the new threat. The first major loss was inflicted on PQ-13 in March of 1942 (PQ-13 lost five ships). PQ-14 and PQ15 also took heavy losses. Churchill wanted to increase the spacing between the departing convoys as a measure to offset losses. The Royal Navy wanted to stop all lend-lease aid during the summer months. The sun was out nearly 24 hours a day in the far northern Arctic waters and this would make any ship easy pickings for the Germans. For political reasons, the British could not select either option. The convoy schedule had to continue. PQ-16 was given a heavier escort and was increased in size to 35 merchantmen. The Germans sunk seven merchantmen and damaged one in PQ-16. PQ-17 was delayed in departing because the RN had to first protect its convoys going to Malta - it did not have enough escort vessels to go around. The U.S.Navy also could not provide escort assistance at that time because the USN was engaged in escorting U.S. merchantmen off of U.S. waters. PQ-17 sailed in June of 1942; it was a disaster for the Allies. The Germans sank 23 of the 36 ships. PQ-18, which departed on 02 September 1942, lost 13 out of 40 ships.
Here is an example of PQ convoy. In January of 1944, an American lend-lease convoy left Seattle bound for Vladivostok. Its manifest read as follows:
46 merchantmen (all 8-10K ton ships); built by McCormack Ship Yards; Soviet flagged (to avoid being torpedoed by the Japanese who could attack U.S. flagged vessels but who could not attack Soviet flagged ones) and Soviet crewed.
Six of the 46 ships were loaded with ammunitions and small arms. Four of the 46 ships were loaded with foodstuffs. Two of the 46 ships were loaded by Dodge (presumably with trucks). One ship was loaded by Westinghouse (presumably with communications gear).
They carried:
# 22.000 tons of steel provided by U.S. Steel.
# 3.000 truck chassis, by Ford (the Soviets also assembled U.S. trucks from parts).
# 3.000 truck differentials from Thornton Tandem Co.
# 2.000 tractors by Allis Chalmers Co. (agricultural and military use)
# 1.500 automotive batteries from the Price Battery Corp.
# 1.000 aircraft provided by the North American Aviation Co.
# 612 airplanes from the Douglas Aircraft Co.
# 600 trucks from Mack.
# 500 Allison aircraft engines.
# 500 half-tracks from Minneapolis Moline Co.
# 400 airplanes from Bell Aircraft
# 400 electric motors from Wagner Electric Co.
# 400 truck chassis by GM (see Ford above)
# 310 tons of ball bearings from the Fafnir Company.
# 200 aircraft provided by the U.S. Navy
# 200 aircraft engines by Aeromarine
# 100 tractor-trailer units by GM (trucks)
# 70 aircraft engines by Pratt & Whitney
In the end, Ultra and more dedicated Allied naval efforts helped to secure the northern lend-lease routes from German attacks. The Kriegsmarine lost a number of heavy ships for their efforts as well.
The following table, not an inclusive one by any means, shows the extent of lend-lease aid the Western Allies provided to the Soviet Union from 01 October 1941 to 31 March 1946 (not a typo, aid went on well after WWII ended). CW - Commonwealth contribution; US - American contribution:
Aircraft - 7.411 (CW) + 14.795 (US) = 22.206
Automotive:
--- 1.5 ton trucks 151.053 (US)
--- 2.5 ton trucks 200.662 (US)
--- Willys Jeeps 77.972 (US)
Bren Gun Carriers - 2.560 (CW)
Boots - 15 million pairs (US)
Communications equipment:
--- Field phones - 380.135 (US)
--- Radios - 40.000 (US)
--- Telephone cable - 1.25 million miles (US)
Cotton cloth - 107 million square yards (US)
Foodstuffs - 4.5 million tons (US)
Leather - 49.000 tons (US)
Motorcycles - 35.170 (US)
Locomotives - 1.981 units (US)
Rolling stock - 11.155 units (US)
Tanks - 5.218 (CW) + 7.537 (US) = 12.755
Tractors - 8.701 (US)
Trucks - 4.020 (CW) + 357.883 (US) = 361.903
In the early 1930’s the U.S. helped lay the foundations for a formidable Soviet truck production capability. During the war, Soviet production efforts were augmented through lend-lease aid. In terms of truck usage, U.S. lend-lease trucks generally went directly to front line combat units. Soviet built trucks were generally used in rear areas. Chevrolet, Dodge, Ford, Studebaker, etc., all could be found on the eastern front. The Soviet Union ended the Second World War by having over 650.000 trucks available for use. Of those, 58% were Soviet in origin, 33% British or U.S. and the remaining percentage captured from the Germans.
U.S. lend-lease food supplies were sufficient to supply 6 million Soviet soldiers with one pound of (quality) consumables for each day of the war. Also, U.S. food supplies, such as canned Spam, had a seemingly indefinite shelf-life and could be stored anywhere without spoilage when compared to one of the standard Soviet military staple diets, dried fish (consuming dried fish causes one to drink more - this in turn increases the number of "breaks" one has to take - and that is not a desirable condition if one is close proximity to enemy lines).
Lend-lease aid amounted to approximately 10-12% of the total Soviet war production effort. While this does not seem like a significant amount, having 10% more key supplies available could make the difference between holding the line to going on the offensive.
From the Soviet geo-political perspective, Germany was enemy number one; especially after 1933. In order to defeat Germany, the Soviet Union would first have to establish the economic and the military infrastructures that would lead to the primary goal (the defeat of Germany). The Soviets searched high and low for the best of everything the west could offer; Christie tank designs from the U.S.; U.S. industrial production know-how; Czechoslovakian and German military hardware; etc. The Soviets also made a “top to bottom” review of their military supply system to seek the most efficient solutions. Western armies of the World War Two era were still modeled on the old Napoleonic way of thinking - provide each combat division with ample service and supply capabilities so they can draw upon rear area stocks as needed. The Soviets reversed that order - army depots and army transportation units would (more efficiently) deliver supplies to the troops; more combat troops could then be placed at the front lines. Of note is that the Soviets military transportation system was far more mechanized than the German one (though no one in WW2 beat the nearly 100% mark of the U.S. transportation system). The German military transportation system still relied on horses in May of 1945.
Mention is often made of the fact that Soviet weapons were crude or simple in design and manufacture. While many were clearly so in appearance, they nearly always worked. German weapon systems, for the most part, became more complex as the war progressed and they did not always work as expected (such as the new Pz V’s at Kursk). There were never enough German service technicians on hand to keep all of the German military hardware operating at peak strength. Building complex military technologies often requires having a larger pool of technicians available to fix the inevitable breakdowns.
The bottom line - the ultimate question is one of simple economics and opportunity costs. How does a nation allocate its existing economic resources? What could one do instead if one changed one’s econimic priorities? One could produce a mighty slick looking and most effective Jagdpanther V with all the bells and whistles or one could opt to produce five shoddy looking, but most functional and reliable T-34’s instead. And so the equation goes. The Soviets opted for the latter scenario and they essentially defeated Germany in May of 1945. The Soviet Union produced great quantities of very basic weapons systems to counter the exceptional skills of the German military command. The Germans elected to go for the Jagdpanther V type scenario - they thus lost the economic battle of the war, and thus the war itself.
Sources : feldgrau
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